In this paper, the authors give the definitions of a coprime sequence and a lever function, and describe the five algorithms and six characteristics of a prototypal public key cryptosystem which is used for encryption and signature, and based on three new problems and one existent problem: the multivariate permutation problem (MPP), the anomalous subset product problem (ASPP), the transcendental logarithm problem (TLP), and the polynomial root finding problem (PRFP). Prove by reduction that MPP, ASPP, and TLP are computationally at least equivalent to the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in the same prime field, and meanwhile find some evidence which inclines people to believe that the new problems are harder than DLP each, namely unsolvable in DLP subexponential time. Demonstrate the correctness of the decryption and the verification, deduce the probability of a plaintext solution being nonunique is nearly zero, and analyze the exact securities of the cryptosystem against recovering a plaintext from a ciphertext, extracting a private key from a public key or a signature, and forging a signature through known signatures, public keys, and messages on the assumption that IFP, DLP, and LSSP can be solved. Studies manifest that the running times of effectual attack tasks are greater than or equal to O(2 n ) so far when n = 80, 96, 112, or 128 with lg M ≈ 696, 864, 1030, or 1216. As viewed from utility, it should be researched further how to decrease the length of a modulus and to increase the speed of the decryption. [5] , which indicates that there always exists one sufficiently large setting of the security dominant parameter that makes utilization of a cryptosystem feasible and breaking of the cryptosystem infeasible in polynomial time [6] . Taking RSA based on the integer factorization problem (IFP) as an example, when the bit-length of a RSA modulus reaches 1024, attack is infeasible but encryption and decryption are feasible in polynomial time. Such a security is referred to as asymptotic security, which is distinguished from exact security or concrete security. The exact security is practice-oriented, and aims at giving more precise estimates of time complexities of attack tasks [7] . In some public key cryptosystems, trapdoor functions can prevent a related plaintext from being recovered from a ciphertext, but cannot prevent a related private key from being extracted from a public key. For instance, in the MH knapsack cryptosystem [8] , the subset sum problem (SSP) which contains the trapdoor information cannot prevent a MH private key from being extracted from c i ≡ a i W (% M) by the method of accumulating points of minima [9] , and moreover, when a related knapsack density is less than 1, the low-density SSP (LSSP) will degenerate to a polynomial time problem from a NPC problem owing to the L 3 lattice base reduction algorithm [10] [11] which is employed for finding the shortest vector or an approximately shortest vector in a lattice [12] .
Introduction
The trapdoor functions for RSA [1] and ElGamal [2] public key cryptosystems [3] are computationally one-way [4] [5] , which indicates that there always exists one sufficiently large setting of the security dominant parameter that makes utilization of a cryptosystem feasible and breaking of the cryptosystem infeasible in polynomial time [6] . Taking RSA based on the integer factorization problem (IFP) as an example, when the bit-length of a RSA modulus reaches 1024, attack is infeasible but encryption and decryption are feasible in polynomial time. Such a security is referred to as asymptotic security, which is distinguished from exact security or concrete security. The exact security is practice-oriented, and aims at giving more precise estimates of time complexities of attack tasks [7] . In some public key cryptosystems, trapdoor functions can prevent a related plaintext from being recovered from a ciphertext, but cannot prevent a related private key from being extracted from a public key. For instance, in the MH knapsack cryptosystem [8] , the subset sum problem (SSP) which contains the trapdoor information cannot prevent a MH private key from being extracted from c i ≡ a i W (% M) by the method of accumulating points of minima [9] , and moreover, when a related knapsack density is less than 1, the low-density SSP (LSSP) will degenerate to a polynomial time problem from a NPC problem owing to the L 3 lattice base reduction algorithm [10] [11] which is employed for finding the shortest vector or an approximately shortest vector in a lattice [12] .
Along with the elevation of a computer′s CPU speed, the security dominant parameter of a cryptosystem becomes larger and larger. For instance, the bit-length of modulus of the ElGamal cryptosystem based on the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) is already up to 1024. We think that there are currently four manners of decreasing the bit-lengths of security dominant parameters and meantime increasing the one-wayness of related trapdoor functions.
The first manner is to transplant known cryptosystems to a complex algebraic system from a simple one ─ the elliptic curve analogue of ElGamal referable to elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for example. By now, any effectual algorithm which can find out generic elliptic curve discrete logarithms in time being subexponential in the bit-length of a modulus has not been discovered yet [13] .
Theoretically, almost every existing cryptosystem may have an elliptic curve analogue. However, not every analogue can bring the same effect as the analogue of ElGamal ─ the analogue of RSA whose security still relies on the two large prime factors [14] for example.
The second manner is to design cryptosystems over polynomial rings ─ the NTRU cryptosystem for example. The shortest vector problem (SVP) is the security bedrock of NTRU since it is impossible to seek an NTRU secret polynomial or an NTRU plaintext polynomial through the L 3 lattice base reduction on condition that two special parameters c h and c m are fitly selected [15] .
The third manner is to construct cryptosystems based on the tame automorphism of multivariate quadratic polynomials over a small field ─ the TTM scheme [16] and the TTS scheme [17] ordinarily referred to as the multivariate cryptosystems for example.
The fourth manner is to devise cryptosystems over small prime fields through discovering or constructing new one-way computational problems which should be harder than IFP, DLP, or LSSP in light of the found evidence. Some threads of the fourth manner are given in this paper. The paper has five novelties: Gives the definitions and properties of a coprime sequence, a lever function, and a bit shadow; offers three new computational problems -the multivariate permutation problem (MPP)
δ (% M), the anomalous subset product problem (ASPP) Ḡ ≡ ∏ n i=1 C i ḅ i (% M), and the transcendental logarithm problem (TLP) y ≡ x x (% M), proves that the three problems are computationally at least equivalent to DLP in the same prime field each, and finds some evidence which inclines people to believe that the three problems are separately harder than DLP; over a prime field, designs the five algorithms of a prototypal public key cryptosystem called REESSE1+;
analyzes the security of REESSE1+; proposes and proves the double congruence theorem.
MPP which owns the indeterminacy assures the security of a private key and the signature algorithm. ASPP as a trapdoor function which can resist the L 3 lattice base reduction assures the security of a ciphertext. TLP protects a private key against being extracted from a signature, and moreover it concerts with a form of the polynomial root finding problem (PRFP) a x n + b x n -1 + c x + d ≡ 0 (% ) with a ≠ 0, 1, |b| + |c| ≠ 0, and d ≠ 0 to assure the security of a signature. Provable security by reduction is appreciable, but not sufficient, and thus the exact security of REESSE1+ should be analyzed. It is not difficult to understand that REESSE1+ is essentially a multiproblem cryptosystem. The security of a multiproblem cryptosystem is equivalent to the complexity of what is easiest solved in all the problems. Additionally, MPP contains the four variables almost independent, and therefore, in a broad sense, REESSE1+ may be regarded as multivariate. A multiproblem cryptosystem must be a multivariate cryptosystem because only multiple variables can bring multiple problems.
REESSE1+ is different from REESSE1 which has a ciphertext [18] and an insecure signature (U = (U Q H) S % M, V = V T % M) [19] , and also different from the Naccache-Stern cryptosystem which has a ciphertext c = ∏
Ay j = Ay 1 …Ay h . Since the two subsequences are unequal, there must exist a certain element A z which does not belong to the two subsequences at one time.
Without loss of generality, let A z ∈ {Ax 1 , …, Ax m } and A z ∉ {Ay 1 , …, Ay h }.
By the fundamental theorem of arithmetic [14] , there must exist a prime q which is a divisor of A z .
Firstly, assume that ∀ A i , A j ∈ {A 1 , …, A n }, gcd(A i , A j ) = 1, namely A 1 , …, A n are pairwise coprime.
Then, there does not exist a common prime divisor between any two elements, which manifests that the prime divisors of every element do not belong to any other elements.
Thus, q must be a divisor of ∏ m i=1 Ax i but not a divisor of ∏ h j=1 Ay j , which means that the integer G has two distinct prime factorizations, and is in direct contradiction to the fundamental theorem of arithmetic.
Secondly, assume that ∃ A s , A t ∈ {A 1 , …, A n } with gcd(A s , A t ) ≠ 1.
According to Definition 1, ∀ A r ∈ {A 1 , …, A n } with r ≠ s, t, there are (A s / gcd(A s , A t )) ł A r and (A t / gcd(A s , A t )) ł A r , which means that both at least one divisor of A s and at least one divisor of A t are not contained in any other elements. Let z = s or t, and q be a prime divisor of A z with q ł A r ∀ r ≠ z ∈ [1, n] .
Notice that from the above assignment, we know A z ∈ {Ax 1 , …, Ax m } and A z ∉ {Ay 1 , …, Ay h }. In sum, the mapping between G and {Ax 1 , …, Ax m } is one-to-one. 
On the other hand, there is ∑ n−k j=1 ḅ y j = 0, where ḅ y 1 , …, ḅ y n − k are 0-bit shadows.
In total, there is ∑ n i=1 ḅ n = n. Property 2: Let {A 1 , …, A n } be a coprime sequence, and b 1 …b n ≠ 0 be a bit string. Then the mapping from b 1 …b n to
ḅ i is one-to-one.
Proof:
Let b 1 …b n and b′ 1 …b′ n be two different bit strings, and separately correspond to ḅ 1 …ḅ n and ḅ′ 1 …ḅ′ n . If ḅ 1 …ḅ n = ḅ′ 1 …ḅ′ n , it is not difficult to understand b 1 …b n = b′ 1 …b′ n . So, the mapping from b 1 …b n to ḅ 1 …ḅ n is one-to-one.
Additionally, since A i ḅ i is not equal to 1 and contains the same prime factors as those of A i , it is known from the proof of Property 1 that the mapping from
one-to-one. Therefore, the mapping from
The secret ℓ(i) in the key transform of a public key cryptosystem is called a lever function, if it has the following features: ℓ(i) is an injection from the domain {1, …, n} to the
the mapping between i and ℓ(i) is established randomly without an analytical expression; an attacker has to be faced with all the permutations of elements in Ω when extracting a related private key from a public key; the owner of a private key only need to considers the accumulative sum of elements in Ω when recovering a related plaintext from a ciphertext. Feature and make it clear that if n is large enough, it is infeasible for an attacker to search all the permutations of elements in Ω exhaustively while decryption is feasible in time being polynomial in n. Thus, the amount of calculation on ℓ(.) at 'a public terminal' is large, and the amount of calculation on ℓ(.) at 'a private terminal' is small.
Concretely to REESSE1+,
, n is on the position of an exponent. Property 3 (Indeterminacy of ℓ(.)): Let δ = 1 and
It is easy to understand that W
However, it should be noted that when W  = , there is
Let Ō d be an oracle on seeking a discrete logarithm from DLP.
Suppose that W ′ ∈ [1, ] is a generator of (
In light of group theories, ∀ A′ z ∈ {2, …, Þ}, the
Further, from C x ≡ A′ x W ′ ℓ′ (x ) (% M) and C y ≡ A′ y W ′ ℓ′ (y ) (% M), we can obtain many distinct pairs (A′ x , A′ y ), where A′ x , A′ y ∈ [1, ], and ℓ′(x) + ℓ′(y) ≡ ℓ′(z) (% ).
Notice that letting Ω = {5, …, n + 4}, namely every ℓ(i) ≥
makes seeking
face an unsolvable Galois group when A i is guessed [22] , and especially when Ω is any subset containing n elements of {1, …, }, Property 3 still holds.
Assume that ℓ(x) + ℓ(y) = ℓ(z), and let
, where L is an positive integer.
. By Theorem 12.19 in Section 12.3 of [23] , L / A z is a convergent of the continued fraction expansion of G′ / M. Property 3 illuminates that ℓ(x) + ℓ(y) = ℓ(z) is not necessary for the above discriminant. Therefore, a continued fraction attack on C i ≡ A i W ℓ (i) (% M) according to the discriminant will be ineffectual as long as Λ and Ω are fitly selected [24] . However, the robust Λ and Ω will make the decryption of a ciphertext get slow. Hence,
is not an efficient key transform.
Design of the REESSE1+ Public key Cryptosystem
In essence, REESSE1+ is a prototypal cryptosystem which is used to expound some foundational concepts, ideas, and methods.
The Key Generation Algorithm
This algorithm is employed by a certificate authority or the owner of a key pair.
Let p 1 , …, p n be the first n primes in the set , Λ = {2, 3, …, 1201}, and Ω = {5, 7, …, 2n + 3}. Assume that đ, Đ, T, S are four pairwise coprime integers, where đ ∈ [5, 2 16 ], T ≥ 2 n , and Đ contains a prime not less than 2 n . S1: Randomly generate a coprime sequence {A 1 , …, A n } with A i ∈ Λ.
S2: Find a prime M > (
At last, regard ({C i }, α, β) as a public key, ({A i }, {ℓ(i)}, W, δ, Đ, đ, ħ) as a private key, and (S, T, M) as being in common.
Notice that if REESSE1+ is pragmatized, we suggest that the set Ω = {+/−5, +/−7, …, +/−(2n + 3)}, where every sign +/− means that '+' or '−' is selected, and unknown to the public, which may bring more indeterminacy, and that gcd(W, Đ ) > 1, which may avoid the existence of W -1 % Đ no matter what the value of Đ is.
At S3, to seek δ, 
, n is called the multivariate permutation problem, shortly MPP.
The Encryption Algorithm
Assume that ({C i }, α, β) is a public key, and b 1 …b n ≠ 0 is a plaintext block or a symmetric key. S1:
Notice that α and β are unuseful for the encryption.
Definition 5: Let {C 1 , …, C n } be a non-coprime sequence, and M be a prime. Seeking the original b 1 
shortly SPP. Definition 6: Let {C 1 , …, C n } be a non-coprime sequence, and M be a prime. Seeking the original ḅ 1 …ḅ n , namely
is called the anomalous subset product problem, shortly ASPP.
The Decryption Algorithm
Assume that ({A i }, {ℓ(i)}, W, δ, Đ, đ, ħ) is a related private key, and Ḡ is a ciphertext.
Notice that because ∑
S7: If G ≠ 1, go to S2; else end. So, the original plaintext block or symmetric key b 1 …b n is recovered.
Only if Ḡ is a true ciphertext, can this algorithm terminate normally. In decryption, {ℓ(i)}, Đ, đ, and ħ are unhelpful.
The Digital Signature Algorithm
Assume that ({A i }, {ℓ(i)}, W, δ, Đ, đ, ħ) is a private key, F is a file or message to be signed, and hash is a one-way compression function. S1: Let H ← hash(F), whose binary form is b 1 …b n . S2:
So, a signature (Q, U) on the file F is obtained, and sent to a receiver together with F.
It is known from S3, S4 that
. It should be noted that owing to đ ł ā, gcd(Đ, đ) = 1, and đ
According to the double congruence theorem (see Section 3.6), in the signature algorithm we do not need
where
At S5, the probability of finding a fit U is roughly 1 / đ. Because đ is a small number, U can be found out at a good pace. The small đ, however, does not influence the security of REESSE1+ (see Section 6.3).
n -1 + ξ + r U S contains the factor đ, it must be contained in ∆ % .
Besides, due to đ ł S and đ ł (WQ) n -1 (according to đ ł (WQ)), if we want to make đ | ∆, there must be đ ł (r U S + ξ)
Therefore, as long as every value of r makes r U S different, đ | ∆ will holds after about đ attempts of r. The algorithm can also terminate normally because after r traverses the interval [1, đ 2 16 ], the probability of đ ł ∆ is (1 -1 / đ) đ 2 16 , and almost zero. 
that is, the two congruences have the same set of solutions. Furthermore, the sufficient and necessary condition for either congruence to have solutions is c  / h ≡ 1 (% M). For the proofs of Theorem 1 and 2, refer to [26] , and for the proof of Theorem 3, refer to [27] . The solution which is obtained in terms of Theorem 1 or 2, and may be written as a certain power of c modulo M is called the trivial solution to the congruence x k ≡ c (% M) [27] .
The Identity Verification Algorithm
Assume that ({C i }, α, β) is a related public key, and (Q, U) is a signature on the file or message F. S1: Let H ← hash(F), whose binary form is b 1 …b n . S2:
If X = Y, the identity is valid and F intact; else the identity is invalid or F modified. By running this algorithm, a verifier can judge whether a signature is genuine or fake, prevent the signatory from denying the signature, and prevent an adversary from modifying the file. In what follows, we argue the discriminant X ≡ Y (% M) at S4.
It is known from Section 3.1 that
where k is a integer, and then
The Double Congruence Theorem
Theorem 4 (The Double Congruence Theorem): Assume that M is a prime, and that s and t satisfying gcd(s, t) = 1 are two constants, then simultaneous equations 
. By the greatest common divisor theorem [14] , there exists a pair of integers u and v making u s
Accordingly, a u b v is a solution to the original simultaneous equations.
Uniqueness:
Then, it holds that
By comparison, we have
If at least one between s and t is relatively prime to , by Theorem 1, there must be
If neither s nor t is coprime to , may let k = gcd(s, ), h = gcd(t, ). Then we see gcd(s / k, ) = 1 and gcd(t / h, ) = 1.
Thus, there are (
Theorem 3 and gcd(s, t) = 1, we know gcd(k, h) = 1. In terms of the group theory [22] , when gcd(k, h) = 1, only the element '1' belongs to two different subgroup at the same time. Therefore, x 0 x 1 -1 ≡ 1, namely x 1 = x 0 , and x 0 bears uniqueness.
To sum up, we prove Theorem 4.
Characteristics of REESSE1+
REESSE1+ owns the following characteristics compared with classical MH, RSA, and ElGamal cryptosystems.
• The security of REESSE1+ is not based on a single problem, but on the four problems: MPP, ASPP, TLP, and PRFP. Hence, it is a multiproblem public key cryptosystem. 
Correctness of the Decryption Algorithm
Since (
where ḅ i means what the algorithm shows, and
Proof: According to the key generator and the encryption algorithm, there is
Further, raising either side of the above equation to the δ -1 -th yields
Multiplying either side of the just above equation by
Clearly, the above process also gives a method of seeking
Notice that in practice, b 1 …b n is unknowable in advance, so we have no way to directly compute ḵ. However, because the range of ḵ ∈ (5n, n(2n + 3)) is very narrow, we may search ḵ heuristically by multiplying W -2 , and verify whether G = 1 after it is divided exactly by some A i ḅ i . It is known from Section 3.3 that the original b 1 …b n is acquired at the same time the condition G = 1 is satisfied.
Uniqueness of a Plaintext Solution to a Ciphertext
Because {C 1 , …, C n } is a non-coprime sequence, the mapping from
theoretically many-to-one. It might possibly result in the nonuniqueness of a plaintext solution b 1 …b n when Ḡ is being unveiled. Suppose that the ciphertext Ḡ can be obtained from two different anomalous subset products corresponding to b 1 …b n and b′ 1 …b′ n respectively. Then,
Raising either side of the above congruence to the δ
Without loss of generality,
The above congruence signifies that when the plaintext b 1 …b n is not unique, the value of W must be relevant to θ.
The contrapositive assertion equivalent to it is that if the value of W is irrelevant to θ, b 1 …b n will be unique. Thus, we need to consider the probability that W takes a value relevant to θ.
If an adversary tries to attack an 80-bit symmetric key through exhaustive search, and a computer can verify trillion values per second, it will take 38334 years for the adversary to verify all the potential values. Hence, currently 80 bits are quite enough for the security of a symmetric key. Because |ḵ − ḵ ′| ≤ n(2n + 3) -5n ≤ 32512 ≈ 2 15 with n ≤ 128, and W has at most 2 15 solutions to every θ, the probability that W takes a value relevant to θ is at most 2 15 2 2n / M. When n ≥ 80, there is
which is close to zero. The probability will further decrease when W is a prime since the solutions to θ lean toward being composite integers averagely.
In addition, if please, resorting to ∑ n i=1 ḅ i = n, you may exclude some unoriginal plaintext solutions.
Security Analysis of the Key Transform
We analyze the exact security of the REESSE1+ key transform
∈ Ω = {5, 7, …, 2n + 3}, and A i ∈ Λ = {2, 3, …,
1201}.
We know that when n = 80, 96, 112, or 128, there is lg M ≈ 696, 864, 1030, or 1216. In this case, IFP and DLP can almost be solved in tolerable time, and LSSP with D ≈ n / lg M can also be solved in tolerable time [11] [28] . In addition, because the root finding problem (RFP) y ≡ x k (% M) may be converted into a linear congruence through a discrete logarithm, RFP can also be solved in tolerable time when DLP can be solved in tolerable time.
'Tolerable time' indicates that the running time of an algorithm for solving a problem may be accepted by a user when the time dominant parameter is relatively small. For example, when n = 80, the time O(2 n / 2 ) is tolerable, and
56 is also tolerable [29] .
A public key may be regarded as the cipher of a private key. Since a ciphertext is the mutual effect of a public key and a plaintext, averagely the ciphertext has no direct help to inferring the private key. [28] . A = P T B means that either if A is a hardness of a certain complexity on condition that the dominant variable approaches a large number, B is also a hardness of the same complexity on the identical condition; or A, B both can be solved in linear or polynomial time.
Definition 8 and 9 suggest a reductive proof method called polynomial time Turing reduction (PTR) [25] . Provable security by PTR is substantially relative and asymptotic just as a one-way function is. Relative security implies that the security of a cryptosystem based on a problem is comparative, but not absolute. Asymptotic security implies that even if a cryptosystem based on a problem is proven to be secure, it is practically secure only on condition that the dominant parameter is large enough.
Naturally, we will enquire whether A < P T B exists or not. The definition of A < P T B may possibly be given theoretically, but the proof of A < P T B is not easy in practice. Let Ĥ(y = f(x)) represent the complexity or hardness of solving the problem y = f(x) for x [30] .
MPP Is at Least Equivalent to DLP

Definition 4 refers to
δ (% M) for i = 1, …, n as MPP. It has the following property.
Property 4: MPP is computationally at least equivalent to DLP in the same prime field.
Proof:
where g ∈ * M be a generator. Then, there is
The above expression corresponds to the fact that in the ElGamal cryptosystem with many users sharing a modulus and a generator, user 1 acquires the private key z 1 and the public key C 1 , …, user n acquires the private key z n and the public key C n . It is well known that in this case, attack of adversaries is still faced with DLP, namely seeking z i from C i ≡ g z i (% M) for i = 1, …, n is equivalent to DLP [25] .
Thus, when every g i is weakened to a constant, seeking δ from C i ≡ g i δ (% M) for i = 1, …, n is equivalent to DLP, which indicates that when every g i is not a constant, seeking g i and δ from C i ≡ g i δ (% M) for i = 1, …, n is at least equivalent to DLP.
Secondly, singly consider a certain C i , where the subscript i is designated.
for g i and δ, where i is in {1, …, n}, and Ṟ is a constraint on g i such that the original g i can be found.
, which means that when only a certain g i is known, seeking g i and δ from C i ≡ g i δ (% M) is at least equivalent to DLP. Integrally, seeking the original {A i }, {ℓ(i)}, W, and δ from
δ (% M) for i = 1, …, n is computationally at least equivalent to DLP in the same prime field.
Further, the following analysis will incline people to believe that MPP is harder than DLP.
Attacks by Interaction of the Key Transform Items
Every ℓ(i) ∈ {5, 7, …, 2n + 3} and every A i ∈ {2, 3, …, 1201} are the thinness of
. Naturally adversaries will adopt combinational attack measures around the thinness.
Eliminating W through
If the adversaries divine the values of Ax 1 , Ax 2 , Ay 1 , and Ay 2 , and compute u, vx 1 
where g is a generator of ( 
, namely the value set of W, and if there exists W 1 ∈ V 1 , …, W n ∈ V n being equal pairwise, the divination of δ, {A i }, and {ℓ(i)} is thought right. Notice that to avoid seeking ℓ(i)-th roots, may let W = g µ % M.
and the size of every V i is about n Ω  Λ. In summary, the running time of the above attack is at least
When n = 80 with lg M ≈ 696, Ŧ = 2 110 > 2 n .
When n = 96 with lg M ≈ 864, Ŧ = 2 115 > 2 n .
When n = 112 with lg M ≈ 1030, Ŧ = 2 125 > 2 n .
When n = 128 with lg M ≈ 1216, Ŧ = 2 129 ≈ 2 n . Therefore, Ŧ is not less than a quantity of time exponential in n.
Clearly, the running time of attack by eliminating W through ℓ(
is the same as that of the attack by eliminating W through ℓ(
Eliminating W through the W -th Power
Due to lg M ≈ 696, 864, 1030, or 1216,  can be factorized in tolerable time. Again due to ∏
, where k meets p k ≈ 2n, W can be divined in the running time of about 2 10 . Raising either side of
The above congruence looks to be the MH transform [8] . Actually, {v 1 W, …, v n W} is not a super increasing sequence, and moreover there is not necessarily lg ( 
, and the time
) (see Section 6.3.3), so even if the three equations are considered simultaneously, it is also impossible to determine the values of the four variables almost independent.
In summary, the time complexity of inferring a related private key from a public key is at least O(2 n ).
Attack by a Certain Single C i
Assume that there is only a solitary
for example, and other C i ′s (i = 2, …, n) are unknown for attackers.
Through divining A 1 ∈ Λ and ℓ(1) ∈ Ω, the parameters W and δ ∈ (1, ) can be computed. Thus, the number of solution (A 1 , ℓ(1) , W, δ) will be up to Ω  Λ  2 > 2 n , which manifests that the original (A 1 , ℓ(1) , W, δ) cannot be determined in time being subexponential in n [30] .
Evidently, if 
Security Analysis of the Encryption Algorithm
The security of the encryption algorithm is namely the security of a REESSE1+ ciphertect.
ASPP Is at Least Equivalent to DLP
Definition 5 refers to
It has the following property. Property 5: SPP is computationally at least equivalent to DLP in the same prime field.
, where b 1 …b n is a plaintext block.
Let y ≡ g x (% M) be of DLP, where g is a generator of ( * M , ·), and the binary form of x is b′ 1 …b′ n , namely y ≡ ∏
Then, by calling Ō s (y, g 2 n − 1 , …, g, M), x namely b′ 1 …b′ n can be found.
By Definition 8, there is
namely SPP is at least equivalent to DLP in the same prime field in complexity. Definition 6 refers to
It has a similar property. Property 6: ASPP is computationally at least equivalent to DLP in the same prime field.
with the stipulation ḅ i < n (namely that b 1 …b n contains at least two nonzero bits) when
Further by transitivity, there is
namely ASPP is at least equivalent to DLP in the same prime field in complexity. It is very interesting whether ASPP is harder than DLP or not. We can find some positive evidence.
Piece 1 of evidence:
Observe an extreme case. Assume that C 1 = … = C n = C, then we have
which may be written as
, which is a form of DLP.
However, when C 1 , …, C n are generated, we can check C 1 , …, C n to prevent any two elements in {C 1 , …, C n } from being equal. Therefore, in practice, ASPP cannot be reduced to DLP in any time.
Piece 2 of evidence: Assume that DLP can be solved in tolerable subexponential time.
When DLP can be solved in tolerable time,  can also be factorized [14] [25], so a generator can be found through the algorithm 4.80 in Section 4.6 of [25] .
Let
where g is a generator of (
which is called the anomalous subset sum problem (ASSP) due to ḅ i ≥ b i , and computationally at least equivalent to SSP.
It has been proven that SSP is NP-complete in its feasibility recognition form, and the computational version of SSP with the sufficiently large length and density is NP-hard [4] [25] . Hence, solving ASSP is at least NP-hard. Additionally, the density relevant to ASSP is far greater than 1 because of ḅ i ≥ b i (see Appendix B), which indicates that the L 3 lattice base reduction attack on ASSP will be ineffectual (see Section 5.2). These two points illustrate that even although DLP can be solved, ḅ 1 … ḅ n , namely b 1 …b n cannot be found yet in polynomial time.
The above two pieces of evidence incline us to believe that ASPP is harder than DLP.
By the way, LSSP will degenerate to a polynomial time problem from NPC [11] [31].
ASPP Can Resist L 3 Lattice Base Reduction
It is known from Section 3.2 that the ciphertext
where g is a generator of ( * M , ·) randomly selected. Then, seeking ḅ 1 …ḅ n from Ḡ is equivalent to solving the congruence
where v may be substituted with v + k  with k ∈ [0, n -1] [32] . {u 1 , …, u n } is called a compact sequence due to ḅ i ∈ [0, n] and n > 1.
Recall [10] and [11] . Let {a 1 , …, a n } be a positive integer sequence, ê = 〈ė 1 , …, ė n , 0〉 with ė i ∈ [0, 1] be the solution vector, s = ∑ n i=1 a i ė i , and t = ∑ n i=1 a i . In [10] , there are two important conditions: t / n ≤ s ≤ (n -1) t / n, and  ê
where  ê denotes the distance in l 2 -Norm of the vector ê, which decides the threshold density < 0.6463. In [11] , there are similar t / n ≤ s ≤ (n -1) t / n, and  ê 2 ≤ n / 4, which decide the threshold density < 0.9408. However, for (1), due to 0 ≤ ḅ i ≤ n, the similar conditions do not hold.
It is well understood that the L 3 lattice base reduction algorithm is employed in cryptanalysis to find the shortest vector or approximately shortest vectors in a lattice, and hence, if a solution to SSP has a comparatively big distance, or is not unique, it will not occur in the reduced base.
Let be a lattice spanned by the vectors
which compose a base of the lattice, where N is a positive integer greater than (n 2   ) 1 / 2 = n (but not much greater, or else will influence speed of the L 3 reduction algorithm). Notice that because g is random, is also random.
Let Ḏ be the determinant relevant to a matrix corresponding to the lattice base. Then, by the Guassian heurisic, the expected size of the shortest vector in of n + 1 dimensions lies between [15] Ḏ 1 / (n + 1) ((n + 1) / (2π e)) 1 / 2 and Ḏ 1 / (n + 1) ((n + 1) / (π e)) 1 / 2 , where e ≈ 2.7182818.
In our case, there is lg M / (n + 1) ≈ 9, and the above scope is between (N k 2 9(n + 1) ) 1 / (n + 1) ((n + 1) / (2π e)) 1 / 2 . For (1), the largest distance of the solution vector 〈ḅ 1 , …, ḅ n , 0〉 is n ∈ {80, 96, 112, 128}, and thus it is very possible that the solution vector will not occur in the reduced base. Meanwhile, it will also be influenced by the knapsack density relevant to (1) whether the solution vector surely occurs in the reduced base.
To compute the density of the compact sequence, we extend {u 1 , …, u n } into {u 1 , 2u 1 , …, n u 1 , u 2 , 2u 2 , …, n u 2 , ……, u n , 2u n , …, n u n }. It is not difficult to understand that the length of the extend sequence is n 2 . The density of the compact sequence {u 1 Further, we can estimate the time cost of the L 3 lattice base attack.
Although SLLL, namely segment LLL in floating point arithmetic and L 2 -FP are two of currently fast lattice base reduction algorithms [33] [34], because floating point operation on integers greater than the modulus M with lg M ≥ 696 cannot be executed directly, and even are instable under a low precision circumstance, it is inappropriate to utilize these two algorithms to find the solution vector 〈ḅ 1 , …, ḅ n , 0〉, which manifests that the only classical L 3 algorithm is appropriate.
According to [25] , the running time of attack on equation (1) However, as is pointed out in the above, owing to D > 9 > 2 > 1 and ḅ i ∈ [0, n], it is almost impossible that the solution vector 〈ḅ 1 , …, ḅ n , 0〉 occurs in the final reduced base, which means that attack by the L 3 algorithm will be unavailing. Besides, we also see that there exists an exhaustive search attack on the plaintext block b 1 …b n . Clearly, the running time of such an attack is O(2 n ) arithmetic steps. Hence, the security of a REESSE1+ plaintext is built on the problem
which contains the trapdoor information, and means that computing an anomalous subset product from subset elements is tractable while seeking the subset elements from the product is intractable.
Avoid Adaptive-chosen-ciphertext Attack
Theoretically, most of public key cryptosystems may probably be faced with adaptive-chosen-ciphertext attack.
During the late 1990s, Daniel Bleichenbacher demonstrated a practical adaptive-chosen-ciphertext attack on SSL servers using a form of the RSA encryption [35] . Almost at the same time, The Cramer-Shoup asymmetric encryption algorithm which is extremely malleable, and an extension of the Elgamal algorithm was proposed [36] . It is the first efficient scheme proven to be secure against the adaptive-chosen-ciphertext attack using standard cryptographic assumptions, which implies that not all uses of cryptographic hash functions require random oracles  some require only the property of collision resistance.
Different Ciphertexts of the Identical Plaintext
It is lucky that REESSE1+ can avoid the adaptivechosen-ciphertext attack when a REESSE1+ ciphertext is produced according to the following algorithm:
Paralleling Section 3.2, assume that b 1 …b n is a plaintext block, and {C 1 , …, C n } is a public key. S1:
If i ≤ n, goto S2. S4: Randomly produce s 1 …s n ∈ {0, 1} n .
S5: If
Clearly, when the identical plaintext is inputted many times, the above algorithm will return a ciphertext different from one another every time.
It is easily understood that contrarily, a ciphertext can almost uniquely be decrypted in polynomial time in terms of Section 3.3 and 3.9.
Paralleling Section 3.3, we design a related decryption algorithm of which the running time is equivalent to that of the algorithm in Section 3.3.
In this way, the original plaintext block b 1 …b n is recovered although s 1 …s n is introduced in encryption. Besides, in decryption, {ℓ(i)}, Đ, đ, and ħ are unhelpful.
Appending of a Stochastic Binary String
Another approach to avoiding the adaptive-chosenciphertext attack is to append a stochastic fixed-length binary sequence to the terminal of every plaintext block when it is encrypted. For a concrete implementation, refer to the OAEP+ scheme [37] .
Security Analysis of the Digital Signature
The security of the REESSE1+ signature includes three aspects: a private key cannot inferred from a signature, a signature cannot be forged through known signatures, public keys, and algorithms, and a message cannot be forged through a known or chosen signature.
Unforgeability of a Signature in the Random Oracle Model
Because REESSE1+ is a multiproblem cryptosystem, and MPP preventing a forged signature from being obtained from the signature algorithm is different from TLP or PRFP preventing a forged signature from being obtained from the verification algorithm, the proof in the random oracle model (RO model) given below is incomplete, and only offers another piece of evidence for the security of the REESSE1+ signature.
What Is a Random Oracle
An oracle is a mathematical abstraction, a theoretical black box, or a subroutine of which the running time may not be considered [25] [38] . In particular, in cryptography, an oracle may be treated as a subcomponent of an adversary, and lives its own life independent of the adversary. Usually, the adversary interacts with the oracle but cannot control its behavior.
A random oracle is an oracle which answers to every query with a completely random and unpredictable value chosen uniformly from its output domain, except that for any specific query, it outputs the same value every time it receives that query if it is supposed to simulate a deterministic function [38] .
Random oracles are utilized in cryptographic proofs for relpacing any irrealizable function so far which can provide the mathematical properties required by the proof. A cryprosystem or a protocol that is proven secure using such a proof is described as being secure in the RO model, as opposed to being secure in the standard model where IFP, DLP etc are assumed to be hard. When a random oracle is used within a security proof, it is made available to all participants, including adversaries. In practice, random oracles producing a bit-string of infinite length which can be truncated to the length desired are typically used to model cryptographic hash functions in schemes where strong randomness assumptions of a hash function′s output are needed.
In fact, it draws attention that certain artificial signature and encryption schemes are proven secure in the RO model, but are trivially insecure when any real function such as the hash function MD5 or SHA-1 is substituted for the random oracle [39] . Nevertheless, for any more natural protocol, a proof of security in the RO model gives very strong evidence that an attacker have to discover some unknown and undesirable property of the hash function used in the protocol.
The Forking Lemma
Lemma 1 (the forking lemma): Let Â be a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machime, given only the public data as input. If Â can find, with non-negligible probability, a valid signature (, σ 1 , ḥ, σ 2 ), then, with non-negligible probability, a replay of this machine, with the same random tape and a different oracle, outputs two valid signatures (, σ 1 , ḥ, σ 2 ) and (, σ 1 , ḥ′, σ 2 ′) such that ḥ ≠ ḥ′ [40] .
In [40] , the forking lemma is specified in terms of an adversary that attacks a digital signature scheme instantiated in the RO model. D. Pointcheval and J. Stern show that if an adversary can forge a signature with non-negligible probability, then there is a non-negligible probability that the same adversary with the same random tape can create a second forgery in an attack with a different random oracle. The forking lemma was later generalized by M. Bellare and G. Neven [41] , and has been used to prove the security of a variety of digital signature schemes and other cryptographic constructions based on random oracles [42] .
The forking lemma is applicable to such a type of signature scheme where a signer must perform the following steps to sign the message :
randomly produce a promise σ 1 in a large set;
compute σ 2 by using σ 1 and ḥ. The signature output is a triple (σ 1 , ḥ, σ 2 ). For example, the Schnorr signature scheme [43] may be proven secure in the RO model according to the forking lemma [40] [42] .
Assume that solving y ≡ g x (% M) for x is of DLP, where g is a generator of * M with M prime, and the input to an adversary Â is the public key y.
In terms of the forking lemma, the adversary can obtain two different signatures with non-negligible probability:
where ḥ = hash(σ 1 , ) is an oracle query of the adversary Â during his the first play, and ḥ′ = hash′(σ 1 ′, ) is an oracle query of the adversary Â during his the second play.
The target of the adversary Â is to extract the private key x form the signatures.
Since there is σ 1 = σ 1 ′, there is r = r′. Hence, we have (ḥ -ḥ′) x ≡ (σ 2 -σ 2 ′) (% ). Because there always exists x, the above linear congruence in x has solutions, and x can be found in polynomial time, namely DLP can be solved in polynomial time, which is in direct contradiction to the standard assumption. Therefore, it is infeasible to forge a Schnorr signature.
Proof of Unforgeability of a REESSE1+ Signature
In Section 4.1, we prove that MPP is computationally at least equivalent to DLP, and additionally at present, a subexponential time algorithm for solving MPP is not found. Therefore, we may have a superstandard assumption comparable to the standard assumption.
Assumption 1: MPP cannot be solved in subexponential time.
Firstly, we adapt the REESSE1+ signature algorithm to the modality outputting a triple signature.
Assume that ({A i }, {ℓ(i)}, W, δ, Đ, đ, ħ)is a private, and F is a file or message to be signed.
Define
where U = Ū r % M.
S6: If d ł ((WQ)
n − 1 + rUS + ξ) % , goto S6, else end.
On executing this algorithm which is essentially equivalent to that in Section 3.4, one can obtain the signature (ā, Q, U) that is sent to a receiver together with F.
Secondly, prove the unforgeability of a signature in the RO model.
Proof:
Let ā be a promise produced by the signer. In terms of the forking lemma, during the two plays of the adversary Â, two valid signatures (ā, Q, U) and (ā′, Q′, U′) on the identical file F can be obtained. Then, it is known from the above signature algorithm that (F, ā), and H′ = hash′(F, ā′) .
Because there always exist W, it may be obtained from the two formulas with H and H′ that
(2) Similarly, it may be obtained from the two formulas with U and U′ that (
Multiplying either side of the above equation by
Further, there is (δħ)
Substituting W −δ with (ħδα
. (3), the right value is known, the promise ā is also known, D, a factor of , may be separated in subexponential time, and r, r′ ∈ [1, đ 2 16 ], (r -r′) may be found in subexponential time through a heuristic approach, which means the integer ā Đ(r -r′) may be obtained in subexponential time.
Solving (3) for δ is of RFP of which the complexity is not greater than that of DLP. Thus, δ may be found in subexponential time, and then according to (2) , W may be found.
In addition, by using
, ℓ(i) ∈ {5, 7, …, 2n + 1}, and {A 1 , …, A n } being a coprime sequence, the adversary may obtain {A 1 , …, A n } and {ℓ(1), …, ℓ(n)} in expected subexponential time.
Further, according to Ū ≡ (RW
, R may be found, and according to R ≡ (Q(δ ħ)
, ħ may be found. In sum, the private key ({A i }, {ℓ(i)}, W, δ, Đ, đ, ħ) is found, namely MPP is also solved in subexponential time, which is in direct contradiction to assumption 1. Therefore, it is infeasible in subexponential time that the adversary forge a REESSE1+ promise signature (ā, Q, U). In practice, the promise ā is unpublicized, and therefore, it is at least the same infeasible in subexponential time that Â forges a REESSE1+ signature (Q, U).
Notice that the REESSE1+ verification algorithm is built on the hardnesses different from MPP, so this proof is incomplete for the unforgeability of a REESSE1+ signature, and further security analysis is necessary.
Extracting a Private Key from a Signature Is of TLP or the Indeterminate Problem
To analyze exact securities, we attend to the solution of In our analysis, we assume that RFP can be solved in tolerable time.
It is known from Section 3.4 that there exist 
We see that the number of unknown variables in the two equations is greater than 2, and thus solving (4) and (5) is of the indeterminate problem.
For (4), because δ, ħ are unknown, and the right of (4) is not a constant, it is impossible to solve this equation for R G 0 . If δ is divined, the probability of hitting δ is 1 / δ < 1 / 2 n . Similarly it is impossible to divine ħ owing to ħ ∈ (1, M).
For (5), there is ē
Assume that đ is guessed out, and all the solutions to x đ ≡ 1 (% M) can be found out, then ē -1 may possibly be figured. However, even if ē -1 is known, and the trivial root to (5) exists, the probability that the trivial root just equals the specific R W ḵ -δ is only 1 / T ≤ 1 / 2 n , and moreover due to the randomicity of R, it is thoroughly impossible to separate δ, W, and ḵ from R W ḵ -δ . Secondly, solving the two congruences systematically.
Similarly, if ē -1 is known, and (U
, through the Index-calculus method, one may find out all the solutions to the equation
. However, the probability that a certain solution is no other than (GW
Further, the running time of distinguishing G, W, ħ, and δ from (GW
. Therefore, the time complexity of extracting a related private key from a signature is at least
, which elucidates that even if each element of the subgroup of order đ is known, it does not influence the security of the private key.
Forging a Digital Signature only from a Public Key Is a Hardness
According to Section 3.5, the discriminant X ≡ Y (% M) contains the two variables Q and U of which one may be supposed in advance by an adversary. However, seeking the other by the supposed value is faced with TLP.
TLP Is at Least Equivalent to DLP
We observe y ≡ g x (% M) referred to as TLP by Definition 7.
Assume that g ∈ * M is a generator, where M is prime, then {y | y ≡ g x (% M), x = 1, …, } = * M [22] . Assume that k with gcd(k, ) = 1 is an integer, then also
with gcd(k, ) = 1 is a self-isomorph of the group The above examples illustrate that {y ≡ x x (% M) | x = 1, …, } cannot construct a complete set for a group.
Furthermore, mapping from x to y is one-to-one sometimes, and many-to-one sometimes. That is, inferring x from y is indeterminate, x is nonunique, and even inexistent. Thus, x x has extremely strong irregularity, and is essentially distinct from g x and x k . It should be noted that an attempt at solving y ≡ x x (% M)
for So, these examples manifest that TLP seems to be harder than DLP.
Property 7: TLP is computationally at least equivalent to DLP in the same prime field.
Let g ∈ * M be a generator coprime to , which does not lose generality since g may be selected in practice.
Assume that y ∈ Its output is x ∈ X (each of solutions), or 0 (no solution). Let X 1 = {1, 2, …, }, and
It is easily observed that between the finite sets X 1 and X 2 , there is a linear bijection
which means that the set X 1 is equivalent to the set X 2 [46] . Hence, substituting X 1 with X 2 as the codomain of a function will not increase the running time of Ō t .
Similarly, by calling Ō t (z, M, X 2 ), z ≡ w w (% M) is solved for w, namely all the satisfactory values of w are obtained.
According to w = g x and z ≡ w w (% M), there is x ≡ w g
On the other hand, suppose that
By calling Ō ŧ (y, 1, M), the solution x to y ≡ x x (% M) will be obtained.
Hence, in terms of Definition 8, there is
Combinatorially, in terms of Definition 9, we have that
The congruence y ≡ (g x) x (% M) may be written as y ≡ g Hence, still in terms of Definition 8, there is
). Integrating and , we have that
namely inverting y ≡ x x (% M) is at least equivalent inverting y ≡ g x (% M) for x in complexity. In [47] , we have a similar result by the asymptotic granularity reduction (AGR).
Further discussion. Let y ≡ g v (% M), and x ≡ g u (% M), and then it seems
cannot be expressed as v ≡ u g u (% ). We can also understand that in the process of x being sought from y ≡ x x (% M), it is inevitable that the middle value of x is beyond M because modular multiplication, inverse, and power operations are inevitable.
Considering the middle value of x beyond M, let z 1 = x % M with z 1 < M, and z 2 = x %  with z 2 < . Then there are x = z 1 + k 1 M = z 2 + k 2  and z 1 = (z 2 -k 2 ) % M, where k 1 , k 2 ≥ 0 are two integers. Ahead, we have y ≡ (g (z 2 -k 2 )) z 2 (% M). This formula indicates that due to x % M ≠ x %  with x > M and k 2 unfixable, the relation between x %  and x % M is stochastic when x changes in the interval (1, M M ), which illuminates that it is reasonable to let q ≡ g (z 2 -
If q is a constant, inverting y ≡ q z 2 (% M) is equivalent to DLP. However, q will not be a constant forever. Therefore, it should be impossible anyway that
The above evidence inclines us to believe that TLP is harder than DLP, namely on the assumption that DLP can be solved through an oracle, TLP cannot be solved in DLP subexponential time yet.
The famous baby-step giant-step algorithm, Pollard's rho algorithm, Pohlig-hellman algorithm, and index-calculus algorithm for discrete logarithms [25] are ineffectual on transcendental logarithms. At present, there is no better method for solving TLP than exhaustive search, and thus the running time of solving x x ≡ y (% M) may be expected to be
, there is no determinate relation between y and x, namely y ≥ x or y < x. Therefore, in the case of a small modulus, x in y ≡ x x (% M) is still secure.
In REESSE1+, the form of TLP is y ≡ (c x) x (% M) with c known. When the bit-length of a modulus is very small ─ 80 for example, the difference between the running times of solving y ≡ (c x)
x (% M) and y ≡ x x (% M) is valuable, where c x changes with c, and has more freedom than a single x, which makes the relation between y and x be more indeterminate.
What needs to be emphasized is that TLP is more suitable for designing signature schemes due to the non-uniqueness of its solutions.
Forging a Signature from the Verification Algorithm Is of TLP or PRFP
Assume that H is the output of hash on input of a file F, and (Q, U) is a signature on F.
, an adversary may seek the value of any signature variable by supposing the value of the other variable.
If suppose the value of Q, no matter whether U exists or not, seeking U is equivalent to TLP.
Similarly, if suppose the value of U, seeking Q is also equivalent to TLP.
Faced with RFP and the tight constraint If the adversary hits exactly the small đ, raises either side of the discriminant to the đ-th power, and assumes that Đ | (δ Q -WH) holds, then there is
Now, suppose that Q is known, and U is unknown. If the congruence U
has the trivial solution, work U out by Theorem 2; otherwise work U out by the Index-calculus method. However, Q and U must satisfy the constraint Đ | (δQ -W H). The probability of satisfaction is at most 1 / Đ < 1 / 2 n when δ and W are unknown. Notice that successive values of Q cannot guarantee the integral succession of (δQ -WH), and (Q, U = ((α
does not satisfy the discriminant. Faced with PRFP We observe that (α
is an element of the subgroup of order đ.
Assume that ē is a solution to [25] .
which is a modular polynomial equation in Q.
If this polynomial equation has solutions, and Q can be figured out, U may be evaluated according to (6) . In this wise, Q and U which likely meet the discriminant can be found.
Solving (7) for Q is of PRFP for which a generic subexponential algorithm is not found so far, and in terms of AGR [47] , PRFP is believed to be harder than RFP. Besides, because gcd(u, ) > 1 is fully possible, namely (7) is not necessarily a polynomial of which the first term coefficient is 1, and there exists  ), attack on (7) is ineffectual by the Coppersmith reduction which can find sufficiently small solutions, whose absolute values are less than  1 / n , to a modular univariate polynomial [48] if such solutions exist. Again, if the adversary solves (7) through the probabilistic algorithm in Section 1.6 of [44] , the time complexity
Unmalicious subgroup of order đ We observe from (6) that if đ is guessed accurately, and gcd(U, ) = 1 holds, there is
S T belongs to the subgroup of order đ. Therefore, if gather many enough signatures (Q, U), all the elements of the subgroup are likely found out. However, the analysis in Section 6.2 shows that even if this case occurs, it does not influence the security of a REESSE1+ signature.
Further, through gathering more enough signatures or following the Index-calculus method, all the elements of the subgroup of order đ T are likely found out. They can be described with a general expression in the time L M [1 / 3, 1.923], but picking out a specific element will take the time O(đ T) > O(2 n ) since we must try all the elements one by one.
Forging a Signature from the Signature
Algorithm Is of TLP or PRFP
adversary may attempt the following attack approach.
Correspondingly, there are a c ≡ (α δ -1 ħ If δ, W can be found, ħ may possibly be computed
. The above analysis shows that the acquiring δ and W is the key to the problem. To seek δ and W from a known clear clue, the adversary has to try to solve the simultaneous equations
Obviously, the first equation is computationally at least equivalent to TLP. The second equation contains two variables, and belongs to the indeterminate problem. Raising either side of the first to the W-th power yields
which is still very complicated, and the problem is not simplified.
Let g be a generator of the group ( * M , ·). By the Indexcalculus for discrete logarithms [25] , evaluate u, v, and
. If x is guessed, the two values of W may possibly be obtained according to the above two equations. Nevertheless the two values of W are not necessarily equal to each other, which indicates that the value of x is not right.
If the inverse of W %  exists, there is
Notice that y is of great value to the adversary if it can be found, for the adversary may obtain Q ≡ y
The above congruence is of PRFP which is very intractable, and believed to be harder than RFP [47] . Additionally, because gcd(v, ) > 1 is fully possible, and there exists  ), attack on the above congruence is ineffectual by the Coppersmith reduction [48] . If you are afraid of the Coppersmith reduction, in practice, the exponent n independent of the block length may be substituted with a larger integer.
If  is factorized, Đ is obtained, and
, where Đ contains a prime not less than 2 n . When the Coppersmith reduction is useless, the adversary may attempt the exhaustive search. Nevertheless, its running time is close to Đ ≥ 2 n . Again it is known from the key generation algorithm that there is
. However, such a substitution of W will not make the simultaneous equations reduced since ∏ 
Clearly, an adversary is allowed to utilize the known values of Q and U separately.
If let Q′ = Q, Q′ does not necessarily satisfy Đ | (δ Q′ -WH′), and computing U′ is equivalent to TLP.
If let U′ = U, no matter whether the discriminant has solutions or not, seeking Q′ is also equivalent to TLP.
If the two signatures (Q 1 , U 1 ) and (Q 2 , U 2 ) on the files F 1 and F 2 are obtained, due to Đ | (δQ 1 -WH 1 ) and Đ | (δQ 2 -WH 2 ), we see that
However, inferring F′ from H′ is intractable according to the properties of hash functions. In addition, finding a fit
If many of the pair (Q, U) are gathered, because Q is random, Q and U interrelate through a transcendental logarithm, and the value of U varies intensely between 1 and M, there is no polynomial function or statistic regularity among different (Q, U)′s, which indicates that they are unhelpful in solving TLP, but yet helpful in finding out the elements of the subgroup of order đ or đ T as is pointed out in Section 6.2.
Thus, forging a signature through known signatures with a public key is of TLP or the hash -1 (H).
Adaptive-chosen-message Attack Is Faced with Indistinguishability
In accordance with Section 3.
, where ā is a random integer, and meets (đ T) ł ā.
The randomness of ā leads Q to be random while U is interrelated with Q in a transcendental logarithm, where
. Hence, for the identical file F, there will be many different signatures on it, which manifests that the signature (Q, U) owns indistinguishability.
In terms of [38] , the signature (Q, U) on F is secure against adaptive-chosen-message attack.
Chosen-signature Attack Is Faced with PRFP
It is well understood from the discriminant that
If the values of Q and U are chosen in advance, an adversary may attempt to figure out H and the corresponding file or message F.
Furthermore, let g be a generator of ( * M , ·), and through the Index-calculus method, work out q 1 , …, q n , v, u, w such that 
Conclusion
REESSE1+ is only a prototypal cryptosystem which is used for explaining some concepts, ideas, and methods, so the space and time complexities of the five algorithms are not analyzed in the paper.
A REESSE1+ private key contains 2n + 5 variables, but does not contain quadratic polynomials; thus REESSE1+ is a multivariate cryptosystem different from TTM and TTS.
In REESSE1+, not only the numerical calculation ability but also the logic judgement ability of a computer is utilized; thus the reversibility of the functions is relatively poor.
MPP which contains indeterminacy is a composite problem integrating IFP with DLP. ASPP is also a composite problem integrating IFP, DLP with ASSP, where ASSP can resist the L 3 lattice base reduction. TLP is a primitive problem which may be regarded as consisting of two variables. PRFP is also a primitive problem which contains both addition and multiplication  a x n + b x n -1 + c x Some evidence given in the paper inclines people to believe that MPP, ASPP, and TLP are harder than DLP in the same prime field (M) each, and the evidence given in [47] inclines people to believe that PRFP is harder than RFP, which makes people be interested in it whether or not there exists a polynomial time algorithm for solving MPP, ASPP, TLP, or PRFP in the quantum computational model [21] .
At present, the REESSE1+ cryptosystem is constructed in a prime field M , namely (M). Suppose that M is still a prime number. Then M is a finite field with general addition and multiplication, and M [x] is a Euclidean domain over M , namely a principle ideal domain and a uniquely factorial domain [22] . Additionally, we suppose that P(x) ∈ M [x] is an irreducible polynomial of which the coefficient of the first term is the integer 1. Then M [x] / P(x) constitutes a polynomial ring including a congruent Abelian group. Therefore, it is feasible to transplant REESSE1+ to the ring M [x] / P(x) from the prime field M .
From the dialectical viewpoint, it is impossible that a public key cryptosystem possesses all the merits because some merits are possibly restrained by others. Along with the development of CPU techniques and quantum computations, what people are more concerned about are the securities of cryptosystems, but not the lengths of parameters.
Clearly, as viewed from utility, it should be researched further how to decrease the length of a REESSE1+ modulus and to increase the speed of a REESSE1+ decryption.
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Appendix A -Indeterminate Encryption
Below, a small example is given. This example is only used to explain how to encrypt a plaintext and decrypt a ciphertext through the algorithms in Section 5.3.1, and thus the quantities ħ, S, α, β and the some constraints are not considered.
Let n = 6 and Þ = 19. 
1) Generation of a key pair
2) Encryption
Assume that ({C i }, M) is a public key. Let b 1 …b 6 = 100110 be a plaintext.
Obtain with C n + 1 = 1. So, the ciphertext Ḡ = 75924783 is obtained. Notice that because s 1 …s 6 is randomly generated, on inputting the identical plaintext 100110 many times, we will obtain many distinct ciphertexts.
3) Decryption
Assume that ({17, 10, 13, 9, 19, 7}, 155629, 3761) is a related private key.
Let Ḡ = 75924783 be a ciphertext. 
